However, a number of recent studies fail to find a direct empirical link between index trading and agricultural futures price movements, casting doubt on the view that index trading distorted pricing in these markets (see Irwin and Sanders (2011) for a review of these studies).
The failure to find a link between the positions of a particular group of traders (commodity index traders) and agricultural futures prices does not necessarily rule out the presence of bubble components in prices, particularly during the spikes that have been of such concern to policy-makers. This broader issue of the existence of bubble components in agricultural futures prices has received much less attention to date. Four recent studies have tested for the presence of bubble components in various agricultural prices over the past few years and find mixed results (Gilbert, 2010; Phillips and Yu, 2011; Gutierrez, 2012; Etienne, Irwin, and Garcia, 2012) . These studies utilize new bubble tests developed by Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011) , Phillips and Yu (2011) , and Phillips, Shi and Yu (2012) which can detect and datestamp bubbles by determining whether prices deviate from a random walk and become mildly explosive. In general, these studies indicate grain futures prices experienced periods of explosiveness with evidence for bubbles in the soft and livestock markets less prevalent.
While the findings of these recent studies are informative, their test results may be compromised by the use of a series of cash prices or rolling nearby futures price (i.e., constructed using prices until near the maturity date and then switching to the subsequent maturing contract prices). Bobenrieth, Bobenrieth, and Wright (2012) show that in the presence of supply and demand shocks in a rational storage model, cash prices of storable commodities may behave in a bubble-like fashion but the "bubble" is driven entirely by fundamentals. In earlier work, Williams and Wright (1991) show that in the presence of demand and supply shocks cash prices of a storable commodity may contain large spikes that may be similar to the runs detected by the new bubble tests. Wang and Tomek (2005) show that cash prices in general do not follow a random walk and may contain systematic components. Nearby futures prices often behave essentially as cash prices given the short time to contract expiration (Peterson and Tomek, 2005) .
Thus, explosive periods identified for a cash price or nearby futures price series may be a result of fundamental factors rather than speculative activities.
In addition, there is a technical problem with the use of a series of nearby futures prices for storable commodities. The new bubble tests (e.g., Phillips, Wu, and Yu, 2011) are based on price levels and require the price levels to be differenced before conducting statistical tests.
Because nearby futures price series must be "rolled" from one nearby contract to the next before the near contract expires, the price difference on each roll date will be computed across contracts.
If a storable market is in contango (near < deferred) the price change will be a relatively large positive value and if a market is in backwardation (near > deferred) the price change will be a relative large negative value. These may not be representative of actual price changes for individual futures contracts on roll dates. The potential for large distortions is especially notable under backwardation since there is no upper bound on how much the nearby can exceed the deferred. The end result is that considerable noise may be introduced into bubble tests with the use of a rolling series of nearby futures prices in storable commodity markets.
In this paper, we use the daily prices from individual futures contracts to test whether speculative bubbles exist in agricultural futures markets and identify whether patterns of bubble behavior exist over time. A series of prices from an individual futures contract will behave as a sequence of expected cash prices at maturity and should follow a random walk if one assumes rational expectations and no risk premium or basis risk (Peterson and Tomek, 2005) . Deviations from a random walk in the series of prices for individual futures contracts may thus provide more reliable evidence for the presence of a bubble component in prices. We also test for bubbles over very long sample periods. In particular, we test for bubbles in samples of daily prices for 12 agricultural futures markets that begin as far back as 1970 and run through 2011. This allows us to compare the behavior of agricultural futures prices during recent spikes with those during the mid-1970s, the last period of comparable market volatility (Piesse and Thirtle, 2009 ). The testing algorithm, recently developed by Philips, Shi, and Yu (2012, PSY hereinafter) , is based on forward and backward recursively calculated Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics and is more powerful than previously developed tests because it can detect the existence of multiple explosive periods and find their origination and termination dates. The test procedure is applied to prices from one individual agricultural futures contract per year, typically using the maturity with the highest trading volume.
In addition to the usual formal tests of bubble behavior and time-stamping of bubble periods, we also analyze the characteristics of the bubble periods in terms of length and the size of autoregressive coefficients. Finally, we also conduct an event study to determine whether there is consistent evidence of market prices over-shooting equilibrium during bubble periods.
Test results demonstrate that all 12 agricultural markets experienced multiple periods of price explosiveness. However, bubble episodes only represent a very small portion of the price behavior for the 42-year period. In addition, most of the bubbles are short-lived, lasting fewer than 20 days. We also find that explosive periods are more common with longer durations in the first half of the sample period, indicating that the most recent bubble episodes may not have been as severe as the mid-1970s episode. Relating bubble magnitudes to coefficient estimates from the SADF test, we find that with the exception of few beginning dates, bubbles have tended to be relatively mild during explosive episodes.
Though receiving far less public attention, results from this study suggest that negative bubbles contribute significantly to price behavior, accounting for more than one-third of total bubble episodes. In general, the size of the bubble (return from bubble extremum to end of bubble) increases as the bubble signal (return from start to bubble extremum) gets larger for both positive and negative bubbles. It appears that during the last half of the sample period, with a couple of exceptions, agricultural futures markets have adjusted faster to stochastic shocks than in the first half of the sample period, resulting in fewer bubbles of shorter length and less overreaction.
Bubble Testing Procedure
Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011, PWY hereinafter), Phillips and Yu (2011, PY hereinafter), and Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012, PSY hereinafter) recently developed a series of recursive bubble testing procedures to detect and date-stamp the exact bubble origination and collapse dates. These procedures were motivated by the observation that the traditional unit root and cointegration-based tests proposed by Diba and Grossman (1998) may fail to detect the existence of bubbles when they are periodically collapsing, as demonstrated by Evans (1991 Etienne, Irwin, and Garcia (2012) have applied the PSY procedure to nearby grain futures prices and find significant evidence of explosive periods in all four markets examined.
Futures Price Data
As noted earlier, explosive periods identified by previous work that relies on cash prices (Phillips and Yu 2011) or rolling nearby futures prices (Gilbert 2010; Gutierrez, 2012; Etienne, Garcia, Irwin 2012) , may be driven by fundamental demand and supply factors rather than an explosive bubble component. In contrast, futures prices derived from an individual contract should behave as a random walk under fairly general conditions. Specifically, the futures price at time for a contract maturing at is the expected cash price of a certain commodity at time conditional on the information available at time (e.g., Fama and French, 1987; Tomek, 1997) , or | , assuming rational expectations, no risk premium, and no basis risk. Hence, prices from individual futures contracts will behave approximately as a sequence of expected cash prices at maturity and follow a random walk (Peterson and Tomek, 2005) . Deviations from a random walk in the series of prices for individual futures contracts may thus provide a "cleaner" test of bubble components in agricultural futures prices.
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Two issues are presented when using individual contract prices for bubble tests. First, an important characteristic of futures prices for an individual contract is that price variance increases as contract maturity approaches (Samuelson, 1965) . This hypothesis has been widelytested empirically, and in general, studies have agreed that the "time-to-maturity" effect does exist (e.g. Anderson 1985) . In addition, prices and price variability for annual crops are affected by the seasonality of underlying markets. This implies that, holding other factors constant, prices should be more volatile in the growing season as more information about expected yield arrives during this period (Tomek and Peterson, 2001 As a result, 40 contracts are examined for feeder cattle and 39 for coffee futures.
Given that trading for contracts often extends more than a year before expiration, the price data needs to be aligned in order to avoid periods of potentially overlapping bubbles. For instance, futures quotes on 6/1/2010 are available for both December 2010 and December 2011 corn contracts. If both prices pass the PSY test then this date will be considered explosive in both price sequences. To avoid this, we let each price sequence start 13 months before the contract expiration dates and end on the last trading day of the month before the contract expires.
These two rules result in 13-month sample period for each contract. For instance, the sample for power to detect bubble periods if they exist. Finally, since the time period for each futures price sequence is 13 months or less there is no need to deflate the data, as the consumer price index (CPI) is unlikely to vary much over each 13 month period.
Test Results
As a first step in determining the existence of explosive periods and locating their exact origination and termination dates, the lag order in the estimation equation (5) must be specified.
Phillips and Yu (2009) argue that the asymptotic distributions of the test statistics remain the same when a low lag order is used, so PY (2011) used a lag order of zero when conducting the forward recursive analysis with initialization of the first observation. PSY further demonstrate that adding lag orders can potentially bias the estimation results and recommend obtaining the ADF test statistics with a lag order of zero. We thus employ the testing strategy recommended by PSY and set the lag order to zero ( 0 in equation (5)). The initial start-up sample for the generalized forward recursive analysis contains 20 observations, or roughly one month. The minimum window size is 20 observations as well. 5 As an example, consider obtaining the SADF test statistics for a fixed ending data point 21 ( 21), two regressions are estimated where the first starts with observation 1 ( 1) and the second with observation 2 ( 2). is then set to the larger ADF t statistics calculated from those two regressions.
Also note in equations (6) and (7) when defining the end dates of the explosive periods, the price explosiveness needs to last at least h periods to be considered economically meaningful.
PWY (2011) suggest the minimum length of the explosive period to be , giving a minimum length of 5-6 days for the data considered in this study. In a competitive futures market it is reasonable to assume that information is reflected quickly, even if not instantaneously, in futures prices and market participants react rapidly to any new information. Hence, any price movement away from prices based on fundamentals is likely to be short-lived (Streator and Tomek, 1993; Smith, 2012) . This helps to justify a relatively short 5-day rule for defining bubble periods. As a robustness check, we also consider a minimum bubble length of 10 days (or two weeks), which is the criterion adopted in Gilbert (2010) .
For illustration, the PSY GSADF and SADF testing procedure is presented in figure 1 , where we detect and date-stamp bubbles in the 2008 contract prices of soybean oil, KC wheat, and sugar. The GSADF statistic (maximum of SADF) of 2.73 is attained on 3/3/2008 for the December 2008 soybean oil contract. As it exceeds the 95% critical value of 2.57, the price series is said to contain a bubble component. The date-stamping results are found by comparing the SADF statistic with the 95% critical value sequences.
One assumption we implicitly make under the random walk null is that individual futures contract prices do not contain a risk premium, or . It may be possible that short hedgers reward long speculators with a risk premium for bearing price risk, as first argued by Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939) . If this is true futures prices before the maturity date are biased downward in order to embed the risk payment. Such a data generating process including a drift term is , as shown in equation (3). Though the risk premium assumption remains rather controversial and empirical evidence provides mixed results (e.g., Carter, 1999; Garcia and Leuthold, 2004) , it is true that when the drift term is large and the variance of the random component is small, the drift/risk premium term can dominate periods of price spikes, similar to the explosive behavior shown in equation (2). Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2011) show that when the drift term is negligible, or 1 2 ⁄ for a fixed constant , run-ups generated by the explosive behavior can be consistently distinguished from a unit root process. They also propose a consistent procedure to estimate , which we apply to our current data and find that its value ranges from 0.58 to 2.08 for the individual futures contract series. Hence, the risk premium component is negligible for the data considered in this study. The existence of a large risk premium term in individual contract prices may also be ruled out by economic theory. Suppose the drift term equals 1, or 0 and 1. Then the futures market presents a constant growth rate of 100%, which is rather unrealistic. 6 Overall, results from the PSY procedure applied to our current dataset indicate that test results are unlikely to be materially affected by a risk premium component in futures prices.
Complete test results are discussed in the following subsections. To facilitate discussion, the 42-year sample periods are divided into two sub-periods, 1970 -1990 and 1991 -2011 convenience, they are referred to as period 1 and period 2, respectively. Several general patterns emerge from these tests results. For instance, prices in the early sample period are more likely to experience bubbles, with 35% more price sequences containing bubbles in period 1 than period 2. This conclusion holds for the two sub-periods with particularly volatile prices, 1971-1976 and 2006-2011 . In addition, wheat, cocoa, and cotton tend to experience between 20% to 40% fewer bubbles by number of contracts than other commodities.
As an aside, if we run the right-tailed ADF test on each price sequence without the recursive procedure as in PSY, only 41 individual contract price series are found to be explosive at the 95% significance level. The sharp contrast between the results from traditional right-tailed ADF and GSADF tests underline the importance of adopting a recursive procedure when bubbles are periodically collapsing, in which case the price sequences may behave like a unit root or even stationary processes.
SADF Date-stamping Results
Results from the SADF tests are presented in tables 2 and 3 for a minimum bubble length of 5 and 10 days, respectively. The price sequences experiencing bubbles implied from tables 2 and 3 may not exactly match the results presented in table 1 for a number of reasons. First, due to the rules we used to construct price series, the "year" represented in The specific date-stamping results based on the SADF test varies substantially with the minimum bubble length ( in equation (7)) used. On average, about 56% more days experiencing bubbles are identified using a minimum bubble length of 5 compared to 10 for the 42-year period. The increase in feeder cattle and live cattle futures is especially significant, both rising 84% from 238 to 438 days and from 194 to 357 days when using 5, respectively. The discrepancies in the date-stamping results with different presented in tables 2 and 3 highlight the importance of specifying different levels of minimum bubble length in order to obtain a more complete picture of the bubble occurrence when date-stamping for price explosiveness in commodity futures markets.
One important pattern arise from tables 2 and 3 is bubbles tended to occurr less frequently in period 2 compared to period 1. On average, the percentage of days experiencing bubbles for all 12 markets decreased from 5.1% during period 1 to 4.1% in period 2, using a minimum bubble length of 5 days. Results are proportionally similar when 10, as the bubble frequency decreased from 3.6% to 2.5% from period 1 to period 2. Marketwise, it appears that with few exceptions, bubbles occurred much more frequently during the earlier part of the sample period for grains and softs. For instance, bubbles occurred in 10.4% of the sample during period 1 and dropped to 2.8% during period 2 in coffee prices, when the minimum bubble length is 5 days. For livestock, however, bubbles occurred slightly more often in period 2, though the differences in total number of days are rather small. 
Bubble Characteristics
The preceding discussion focuses only on the frequency of bubbles over the sample period, instead of the specific patterns of each bubble episode. Given the existence of bubbles, policymakers are surely interested in knowing how long the bubble episodes tend to last and how fast the bubble grows. Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics of bubble length by commodity during each 21-year sub-period, while figure 3 shows the frequency distributions of bubble length. Several prominent patterns emerge. First, the distribution of bubble length is highly right-skewed. It appears that most of the bubbles are short-lived, with over 80% and 65%
of the bubble episodes lasting less than 20 days for 5 and 10, respectively. Second, bubbles in grain and softs futures tend to last longer than in livestock markets, indicating that storability might have played a role in determining the bubble duration. This difference, however, is more significant in period 1 than in period 2. Third, bubbles tend to last slightly shorter with smaller variations in the period 2 compared to period 1. For instance, the average bubble duration in period 1 ( 5) is 12 days, dropping to 11 days in period 2. This difference in length is statistically significant at the 10% level.
One way to measure the bubble growth rate is to examine how much prices deviated from a random walk, that is, to obtain in equation (4), or , in the regression equation (5) when a significant SADF value is achieved for a fixed ending point . 7 A potential misconception is to associate the SADF test statistics obtained from regression equation (5) deviates from a random walk may not completely reveal how large the bubble has been, it certainly indicates that from a statistical perspective, most bubble periods in commodity futures markets over the past 42 years have been relatively mild.
Event Study of Returns during Bubbles
If bubbles indeed existed in the market, how much may have the observed prices been overvalued compared to fundamentals? Answering this question is particularly challenging for commodities given that their fundamental values are often hard to measure. Gheit (2008) argues that the price of crude oil exceeding $135 per barrel in 2008 is unwarranted, and believing that the fundamental price was below $60 per barrel. Using a Quantum index, Gilbert (2010) finds that the maximum price impact of financial index traders ranges from 9.6% to 17.1% for grains, metals, and energy products. While interesting, these studies can often be criticized for issues related to correctly specifying fundamental values.
In this study, we avoid directly estimating fundamental values and infer bubble size indirectly from price changes during explosive periods. We have assumed that prices follow a random walk when absent of bubbles, which in theory should correctly reflect the fundamental demand and supply relationship. On the date in when a bubble is identified by the PSY procedure the explosive component becomes significant and price can no longer be considered equal to fundamental value. In a competitive futures market we assume that traders will then actively seek to correct the unjustified price movement until eventually a new equilibrium is reached. The price on the date when an explosive period comes to an end may thus be viewed as the new equilibrium price -the price that correctly reflects the new fundamental supply and demand conditions after the market appropriately allocates all the available resources among market participants.
Recognizing that prices are not always upward trending when bubbles occur (e.g. figures 5(b) and 5(h)), we first divide explosive periods into two groups: positive and negative bubbles.
Positive bubbles are defined as when the average price during the explosive period is greater than the initial price when the explosive period starts, and vice versa. To calculate the bubble size, we consider prices at origination, peak (trough), and conclusion dates for each bubble period, resulting in two indicators: returns from start to peak (trough) and returns from peak (trough) to end. Under this framework, the latter indicator measures how much price has corrected before returning to a random walk process. Returns from peak (trough) to end thus provide a measurement of how much the price is overvalued compared to fundamentals.
We focus our discussion on bubbles that last for at least 10 days. These are the bubble episodes that policymakers would be more interested in analyzing given that the impact of a bubble is likely to increase with its length. Table 7 presents the average cumulative daily returns during each bubble episodes in periods 1 and 2 for both positive and negative bubbles. The left panel of table 7 presents the average returns of positive bubbles. As can be seen, the signal of price distortion is often weaker in period 2 compared to period 1 (21% vs. 16%). On average across all 12 markets, price is overvalued 4% in period 1 and 3% in period 2, both statistically significant from zero. The most significant price change occurred in cotton futures, as the percentage of unwarranted price increase gets as large as 11% in cotton futures in period 2. With few exceptions, the price of most commodities often correct beyond 3% in period 1. The magnitude of price correction for markets other than cotton and sugar are rather small in period 2, often less than 2%.
As shown in the right pane of table 7, a substantial portion of the bubbles are negativeaccounting for 36% and 41% of the bubbles across all commodities for periods 1 and 2,
respectively. It appears that negative bubbles occurred most often in softs during period 1, and livestock products during period 2, with each of them accounting for about 50% of the total negative bubbles during each respective sub-period. For both periods, price on average drops around 11% from start to trough during a negative bubble episode, then corrects about 3% by the time it returns back to a random walk. This process typically lasts from 3 to 4 weeks. Given the frequent occurrence of negative bubbles, it is surprising to note that this category of bubbles has been largely ignored by the literature. While prolific public discussion has been directed to positive bubbles when prices rise above its fundamental values, their negative counterparts certainly deserve a comparable amount of attention.
A logical expectation is that during a bubble episode the larger the bubble signal the larger the price correction would be. It would be then useful to formally establish a statistical relationship between those two indicators. This is demonstrated in figure 7 , which shows a scatterplot of the return from start to peak (trough) and return from peak (trough) to end for each period, along with a regression line between these two indicators. The positive relationship is confirmed for both positive and negative bubbles. While the magnitudes of the slope for negative bubbles are quite close during both periods, it is about 1/3 larger for positive bubbles in period 2 than in period 1. It appears that given equally-sized positive and negative bubble signals, the market tends to correct itself in a faster rate when the price is overvalued than undervalued. In addition, period 2 market dynamics are more responsive, correcting much faster for a given increase in bubble signal. The arrival of new traders in recent years, coupled with a dramatic increase in trading volumes and open interests, has increased market liquidity, apparently forcing the market to correct faster to distorted price signals.
Care must be taken not to imply that the relationships in figure 7 can be used as a practical trading rule. For instance, one might be tempted to buy at the beginning of a positive bubble, and sell when the bubble ends. The regression estimates suggest that during period 2 a 1% increase in the price change from start to peak will be following by a 0.32% decrease when the positive bubble collapses. However, this trading strategy is unlikely to be profitable in practice.
First, the regression estimates are based on the ex-post 10-business day rule when determining the bubble episode. In real-time, one cannot foresee how long the bubble will last. The false signals generated by the data are likely to cancel out any potential profit gained from real bubbles. Similarly, the distinction made between positive and negative bubbles are also based on an ex-post rule, though in this case the bubble category may be recognized from the price trend during the first few days of the bubble episode. Third, one may argue that once a positive bubble has been identified, a profit can be established by taking a long position at day 11, then taking the opposite position when the bubble collapses. This is also unlikely to be profitable given that most of the bubbles are short-lived. = 4.37), gradually reaching its peak on 11/9/2010 at 151.23 (or log(price) = 5.02). When the bubble comes to an end on 11/22/2010, the price dropped to 121.9 (or log(price) = 4.80). The estimated regression coefficients suggest that, although the degree to which the price process deviated from a random walk was quite mild throughout the bubble period, the price nearly doubled from the bubble origination date to its peak.
Conclusions
In this paper, we find all 12 of the agricultural commodities examined have experienced multiple bubbles between 1970 and 2011. These results were obtained by applying the multiple bubble testing procedure of Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012) to daily price sequences for individual futures contracts. Unlike previous studies that only use nearby futures prices or cash prices, which may present explosive behavior due to changes in fundamentals, results generated from prices for an individual contract are much cleaner. Applying the SADF date-stamping tests to these 12 commodities, we find that results are somewhat sensitive to the minimum bubble length used.
Overall, 50% more bubbles are identified when using a minimum bubble length of 5 days compared to 10 days. However, even with the 5-day rule, bubbles only represents less than 5%
of the price behavior for the 42-year period in most commodities. We also find fewer bubbles occurred between 1991 and 2011 compared to . An examination of the bubble length suggests that most of the bubbles are short-lived, with over 80% and 65% of the bubble episodes lasting less than 20 days for a minimum window length of 5 and 10 days, respectively. It also appears that the duration of bubbles between 1991 and 2011 bubbles is slightly less, compared to . Relating bubble magnitudes and growth rate to coefficient estimates from the SADF test, we find that with only a few exceptions, bubbles may have been mild throughout the explosive period.
We define a bubble as "positive" if the average price during a given bubble is larger than the price at the bubble start date, and "negative" otherwise. Although more than one third of the bubbles detected by the SADF procedure are negative, it is surprising that little attention has been paid to negative bubbles in the literature. We define the price change from start to peak (trough) as the size of bubble signal, and the price change from peak (trough) to end as the true bubble size that the market has attempted to correct. In general, there is a positive correlation between bubble signal and true bubble size. Additionally, it appears that during the latter sample period, the market has been more responsive to bubble signals, adjusting to new equilibrium faster than the earlier sample period.
Though we find bubbles throughout the 42-year period, their high frequency and magnitude in 1971-1976 and 2006-2011 are certainly of most concern. Interestingly, both positive and negative bubbles tend to be shorter in duration and with smaller sizes in 2006-2011 compared to 1971-1976 . In addition, more bubbles occurred during the earlier period. This pattern holds for almost all the grain, livestock, and softs futures examined.
Our analysis indicates that commodity futures markets are now less prone to bubbles than three decades ago, despite the recent price spikes and heightened price volatility. Relating this to , where . 1991  11  10  21  1992  22  21  23  66  1993  18  9  9  17  53  1994  1  11  97  45  154  1995  0  1996  15  31  13  12  71  1997  10  18  28  1998  15  15  56  86  1999  20  35  12  45  24  136  2000  31  54  85  2001  16  80  11  107  2002  12  48  60  2003  30  28  12  10  16  53  149  2004  10  33  10  53  2005  21  21  2006  10  38  11  59  2007  4  12  9  25  2008  13  23  46  34  17  22  28  11  11  10  215  2009  21  15  36  2010  11  57  70  138  2011  12  12  Sum  58  103  120  62  118  57  204  117  268  149  99  220 Notes: Each explosive episode needs to last at least 10 or 5 days to be considered a bubble. Descriptive statistics are based on the length of bubbles. The Jarque-Bera test is performed to check whether the length of bubbles during each sub-period is normally distributed when pooled across all markets. The total number of days with bubbles implied from this table may not equal the numbers shown in tables 2 and 3 due to rounding. Log(price), left  r1,r2 , right
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